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Abstract 
This paper explores how organizational processes 
are recreated following their destruction in 
unexpected disasters. It applies the notion of an 
organization as a capital conversion and capital 
creation system. It also focuses on systems resilience, 
the measure of a system’s persistence and ability to 
absorb disturbances while reconstructing 
relationships between system entities.  
Based on the analysis of empirical evidence 
collected from the Great East Japan Earthquake 
disaster in 2011, we propose a resiliency model 
incorporating a broader interpretation of the notion of 
capital. The model consists of five dimensions of 
capital: economic, social, symbolic, human, and 
organizational. Once a given capital is destroyed 
together with its creative organizational processes, 
communities will attempt to regain resilience by 
compensating with other dimensions of capital.  
Analyses demonstrate the importance of 
recreating organizational capital that coordinates 
capital conversion and recreation processes to meet 
the vital need of the residents. Examining this process 
of capital conversion and creation enables us to 
extend the notion of resilience.  
 
 
1. Organizational processes for saving 
lives  
 
Following an unexpected disaster, many 
organizational routines and processes are suspended. 
This paper explores how organizational processes are 
recreated after destruction in unforeseen disasters. It 
brings to bear the notion of the organization as a 
capital conversion and capital creation system [1]. It 
also focuses on systems resilience, the measure of a 
system’s persistence and the ability to absorb 
disturbances [2] while reconstructing relationships 
between system entities.  
Many parties are spontaneously involved in 
emergency relief, from individuals to international 
agencies, such as the Red Cross. However, the 
foremost response to a disaster comes from local 
organizations [3]. “Local” may refer to government, or 
voluntary and private organizations, but it is local 
government which owns “the first line of official 
public responsibility [4].” It has prime but differing 
responsibilities for its citizens in (1) confirming their 
whereabouts and safety of residents, (2) delivering 
essential information to residents, (3) operating 
evacuation centers and supporting evacuees, (4) 
transporting and managing relief goods, and (5) 
issuing disaster victim certificates [5]. All of these 
operations are essential for saving lives and supporting 
evacuees right after a disaster.  
In this paper, organizational processes refer to a 
multitude of tasks joining together to perform disaster 
relief operations. A “process” originally is defined as 
collections of tasks that transform inputs into outputs 
[6]. Each given process executes an important function 
and, in itself, consists of a system which must 
accomplish an objective [7, p.270] and create value 
through input-output conversion.  
This paper introduces the “capital resiliency model” 
as a systematic framework of how organizations 
realize resilience through capital conversion and 
capital creation. “Capital” in this paper is defined as a 
source for creating value. This means, we regard a 
system that keeps organizational processes functional 
as one type of capital. Information systems are a good 
example of this in that they are a critical element in 
conducting and supporting disaster relief operations. 
This paper presents the following sections: (1)  
reconsideration of disaster management plans 
underpinning disaster preparedness, (2) submission of 
a capital resiliency framework to overcome the gap 
between plans and realities in the field, (3) 
presentation of empirical research data from three 
municipalities affected by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, (4) development of a capital resiliency 
model, and (5) conclusion. 
 
2. Limits of conventional plans 
 
Generally, organizations draw up a disaster 
management plan intending to mitigate damage from 
a devastating disaster situation. The plan is designed 
to make people, facilities, and organizations robust. It 
defines the chain of command and the tasks to be 
performed [7]. However, the problem is that a plan is 
often effective only in simulated situations, in other 
words, in any type of expected event. Plans fail to deal 
with departures from expected outcomes. In reality, 
unexpected calamities require an adaptable capability 
which recognizes new opportunities in any given 
situation [8] , i.e., previously unseen “capital,” which 
allows the formulation of an effective response. Thus, 
we should change the conventional purpose of disaster 
management to one of preparing an organization to 
think creatively about the unthinkable so that quality 
decisions will be made following a disaster [9]. 
This by no means reduces the importance of 
conventional planning. It is of course useful to make 
predictions regarding damage and plan responses to a 
range of situations. Determination of the chain of 
command is critical, and it is wise to stock up on 
supplies based on a careful estimation of need. Such 
plans should also be widely shared by all people 
concerned. 
The Great East Japan Earthquake, one of the 
greatest earthquakes faced by mankind, illustrates the 
reality of the unexpected. On March 11, 2011, Japan 
was struck by the Great East Japan Earthquake. The 
movement of tectonic plates along the Pacific Rim 
created a rupture zone 500 km long. Measuring 9.0 on 
the Richter scale, the earthquake produced a tsunami 
of 40 meters hitting the coastline and devastating cities 
and towns. The Fire and Disaster management Agency 
reported 19,225 deaths, 6,219 injuries and 2,614 
missing as of March 2015. It also reported 127,830 
houses totally lost and more than 1,000,000 partially 
destroyed. This earthquake was unique in that it 
caused severe damage to a very wide area, above all 
due to a massive tsunami that was beyond any prior 
assumptions. 
All business operations, including those of public 
organizations, were suspended and remained so for 
some time in areas directly affected by the earthquake 
and tsunami. In some areas, power supply and 
connectivity were completely lost at the most critical 
life saving phase immediately following the 
earthquake. In those areas, people were instantly faced 
with a situation they had never experienced and which 
had never been anticipated in any disaster 
management plan.  
From this earthquake, we have come to recognize 
the importance of flexibility when making decisions in 
executing disaster management plans [10]. However, 
at the same time, we should consider that the very 
point of plans and processes is to maintain consistency. 
To achieve this consistency, mechanisms of creating 
value through system processes are not meant to 
change [12, p.164].  
 
3. Capital resiliency framework 
 
To overcome this contradiction in requirements, 
this paper proposes a capital resiliency framework 
with the definition of an organization as a capital 
conversion and capital creation system [1]. Capital is 
a durable and transforming production factor  [11]. It 
is a prior investment intended to create future value. In 
this sense, this paper defines the following five 
dimensions of capital that are inspired by Mandviwalla 
et al. [1] (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Capital Typology [Partly modified ref.1] 
Dimension of 
capital 
Definition 
Economic Financial, physical or 
manufactured resources 
Social Individual or organization 
empowered by the social 
connections 
Symbolic The amount of honor or 
prestige possessed within a 
given social structure 
Human Skills, knowledge and abilities 
that individuals use to generate 
income or other useful outputs 
Organizational  Institutionalized knowledge 
stored in databases, routines, 
patents, manuals and structures 
to support an organization’s 
goal 
 
One form of capital can modulate changes in 
another form through organizational processes (e.g., 
spending economic capital on education to increase 
human capital). The intent of this paper is to 
demonstrate that capital conversion can play a critical 
role in enhancing the resilience of systems. Among the 
five dimensions of capital, organizational capital is 
key to realizing resilience as it provides the conversion 
processes for recreating capital. 
The discussion surrounding resilience originally 
started with the examination of ecological systems 
[12]. It began by differentiating resilience and stability 
[2]. Resilience is recognized as a measure of a 
system’s persistence and the ability to absorb 
disturbances while maintaining the existing 
relationships between system entities, while stability 
is defined as the ability of a system to return to an 
equilibrium state after a disturbance [2]. Subsequently, 
the concept of resilience expanded its scope to include 
the analysis of organizations [13], of supply chain 
management [14, 15], engineering [16-19] and 
business modeling [20, 21].  
Though the literature reflects different views of 
resilience, we take the path of providing adaptive 
capacity and allow for ongoing, proactive  
development; i.e., dynamic, adaptive interplay 
between sustaining and evolving processes in response 
to change [19, 22-24]. In this sense, we recognize the 
notion of resilience as the ability to absorb 
disturbances while reconstructing relationships 
between system entities, not just maintaining the 
existing relationships.  
The emphasis of this paper is on resilience in 
emergency management. Resilience discussed in the 
context of emergency management has been 
incorporated into the international business process 
standard as ISO 22301 (formerly British BSI2599), 
which is intended to maintain business continuity at 
times of extraordinary stress. However, disaster 
management demands more personnel to handle new 
problems that arise in the field [25]. Different types of 
demands and responses should emerge in such an 
environment, and it requires different levels of 
capacity within the system [26].  
To explore the requirement for capacity more 
systematically, this paper combines the notion of 
capital with resilience. The five dimensions of capital 
introduced previously can play different roles through 
their own particular conversion and creation systems. 
The resulting capital resiliency framework is proposed 
as a tool for all organizations to employ in future 
disaster situations. When we consider the reality of 
unexpected events happening, the capital resiliency 
framework reaches well beyond the predetermined 
plan (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Desirable disaster preparedness 
 
In this regard, preparedness is at the opposite end 
of “plans” that are made on the basis of predictable 
damage.  Damage within assumptions can be dealt 
with by plans.  What the Great East Japan Earthquake 
taught us is that the attempt to avoid unexpected events 
by managing plans in advance is impossible. Thus, our 
research leads us to consider how organizations realize 
resilience through capital conversion and capital 
creation. This question is based on the assumption that 
adaptive capacity should be seen as a necessity 
following a disaster.  
In the following section, we show the reality of 
realizing resilience in the Great East Japan Earthquake. 
 
4. How organizational processes were 
recreated during the disaster 
 
The empirical research of this paper is based on 
interviews with officials from three municipal 
governments that experienced huge damage from the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. The two-hour interviews 
were conducted in December 2011, nine months after 
the earthquake. The two respondents from each town 
were officials of information systems departments in 
charge of managing their systems when the earthquake 
struck. They were asked about preparedness, the level 
of damage, and the recovery process of ICT equipment 
including power supply, network connectivity, 
information systems, and related facilities. The 
interview reports were checked and officially verified.  
Archived documents were referenced and additional 
telephone interviews conducted to fill in missing 
information subsequently.  
Within the administrative structure of the Japanese 
government, municipalities occupy the third rung. 
National Government occupies the top tier, followed 
by prefectural governments (47 of them) and 
municipal governments (1,742 cities, towns and 
villages as of January 1, 2014). Legally, the function 
of municipal governments is to provide a variety of 
services to their citizens but above all they are 
obligated to maintain resident information, i.e., the 
data that serves as the foundation for government. 
Prefectures, on the other hand, are defined more 
loosely as wide area governments. 
Among many organizational processes for 
conducting disaster relief operations, we focused our 
interviews on those most revealing about (1) 
relocation to temporary offices (restoration of 
economic capital) and (2) resumption of certificate 
issuing operations (restoration of organizational 
capital). Establishing certification is the most 
important operation that municipalities have to 
undertake in a disaster situation because the victims 
require certificates for identification in banks or 
elsewhere in their effort of reconstructing their 
everyday lives. Therefore, gaining an understanding of 
how this operation is to be recovered must be given the 
highest priority. 
As we discuss each case, we will label (in brackets) 
each dimension of capital in question, it either having 
been lost or reconstituting a candidate for capital 
 
conversion and creation. Following the outline of each 
case, we synthesize our findings for each dimension of 
capital. 
 
4.1. The case of Otsuchi Town – system 
recovery with overwhelming complexity 
 
The case of Otsuchi Town located in Iwate 
prefecture, one of the hardest hit municipalities in the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, illustrates the extent of 
the catastrophe well. 
The town lost its Mayor (human and symbolic 
capital) in the tsunami and his deputy’s term was 
nearing its end on June 20, 2011. As many decisions 
in emergency situation require high level authority, 
absence of a legitimate leader hindered relief 
operations. This forced the town to concentrate its 
efforts on implementing a mayoral election. Thus 
priority was placed on restoring the Basic Resident 
Registration Network System (organizational capital; 
this paper considers ICT environment as 
organizational capital, as it comprises tools to 
integrate a range of operations) that would enable the 
town to generate a voter list. 
The task was not easy. Otsuchi Town lost one-third 
of its employees (human capital) when its three-story 
town office building (economic capital) was 
completely engulfed by the tsunami. The server room 
located on the first floor was submerged in muddy 
water, which disabled all the machines in the room 
(economic capital). All residential data including 
backup was lost (organizational capital). As it was 
apparent that the old system could not be repaired, the 
decision was made to recreate the ICT environment 
(organizational capital) from scratch in a temporary 
town office (economic capital) located in the 
community center. 
The assumption had never been made that servers, 
robustly designed to withstand severe earthquakes, 
could actually be lost. Lack of preparation further 
complicated recovery. Most importantly, a security 
system to protect sensitive data on the servers blocked 
efforts to extract data from them. 
This problem was solved by salvaging residential 
data from a flooded server’s hard disk. Before salvage 
was complete, the town was able to use a back-up 
database (organizational capital) that was fortuitously 
maintained by the town’s system vendor (social 
capital). The back-up data were then fed into a 
temporary system that the town had prepared in the 
community center by March 29 (organizational 
capital). The system vendor lent out the server for 
system development (social capital). 
On April 13, restored residential records salvaged 
from the server hard disk were fed into a second 
temporary system (organizational capital) also 
prepared in the community center. It enabled Otsuchi 
to resume resident services including the issuance of 
residential certificates. The tax system and the 
residential record network system were also restored 
at this time. Naturally, the data was not current, but 
was rather that of March 11 when the tsunami had hit. 
On April 25, officials moved to temporary government 
office buildings that were set up in the grounds of 
Otsuchi elementary school (economic capital).  
Recovery of the Basic Resident Registration 
Network System, necessary to provide synchronized 
service in multiple locations, required the 
reconstruction of physical landline cables as well as of 
communication servers and firewalls (organizational 
capital). The temporary government building was too 
small to house these, so they were also placed at the 
community center. Server room construction and 
network connection were completed on June 15. 
Firewalls were installed on June 29. Preceding that, 
fiber optic cable had been laid between the temporary 
town government building and the community center 
building on May 20. A communications server was 
brought in on July 6 and went into operation after 
preparatory works on July 15. The town was finally 
ready to update its voter list by receiving data from 
other towns reporting people who had moved out of 
town following the earthquake (organizational 
capital). 
Air conditioning became an issue by July at the 
town’s temporary government building. Thus, all of 
the primary servers were moved back to the 
community center where there was functional air-
conditioning. 
The mayoral election was carried out five months 
after the earthquake and two months after the deputy’s 
term had expired, on August 28, 2011. Thus the town 
had been lacking a legitimate leader when leadership 
was critically needed.  
On September 20 temporary servers were replaced 
with permanent servers.  
In summary, slow recovery of information systems 
caused a delay in the election process that, in turn, 
hindered all other recovery processes. It is obvious that 
slow recovery was caused by information systems 
complexity, in other words, lack of adaptive capacity. 
The system was designed securely because it deals 
with residential information, which is supposed to be 
the most important and confidential data municipal 
governments possess. Preparedness for elections is not 
usually included in a disaster relief operation; however, 
this case illustrates the vulnerability of complex, 
hierarchically organized systems [18] in an 
unexpected situation as they are resistant to stress only 
within narrow boundaries.  
 
4.2. The case of Futaba Town – recreation of 
ICT environment from scratch 
  
Futaba town, located in Fukushima Prefecture is 
the local government for the sites of Unit 5 and Unit 6 
of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 through 4 of this 
power plant are located approximately 2 kilometers 
from Futaba. 
On March 11, the information department 
personnel of Futaba left the government building in 
order to remove notices about a town council in 
session. As soon as they arrived back at the 
government building, they were hit by massive 
tremors (at 2:46 p.m.). They immediately went to 
check on the server room. There did not seem to be 
any visible damage, so they did not shut down the 
system. Also, there was no power outage at the 
government building. They then left the server room, 
intent on performing a more detailed check later. 
At 9:23 p.m. on that same day, the national 
government issued an order to the surrounding areas 
of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 for 
the evacuation of residents within a 3 km radius of the 
unit, and it imposed an indoor restriction of residents 
living within a 10 km radius. In the early morning of 
March 12, the day following the earthquake, the 
national government changed its evacuation order and 
requested residents within a 10 km radius of Power 
Plant Unit 1 to leave. 
Before evacuating to another town, information 
department officials placed backup tapes inside the 
server room (organizational capital). They saw off 
evacuating residents and then began evacuating 
themselves. Everyone proceeded west from the 
evacuation shelter, set up in town, together by car and 
town bus on National Route 114. The road became so 
congested with evacuees from towns in the area that it 
took the officials well over five hours to arrive at the 
evacuation site in Kawamata, Fukushima Prefecture. 
This site is located 65 km away from the town, so 
usually this journey would have taken about an hour 
and a half. Officials had intended to return to the 
government building right away because they had 
never expected the accident of the Nuclear Power 
Plant to become such a large calamity. So they carried 
nothing with them but the clothes that they were 
wearing. On arriving at Kawamata, they prepared a list 
of the names of the evacuees, and distributed food and 
supplies such as blankets. 
On March 19, officials moved to Saitama City, 
which is located in 270 km away from the town. The 
place they escaped to was a concert hall (economic 
capital), so there was no equipment for conducting 
municipal operations. When officials arrived, there 
were 10 pairs of printers and computers 
(organizational capital) that were donated by another 
municipality (social capital), which wasn’t heavily 
damaged in the earthquake but had experienced 
evacuation when a large earthquake had hit Japan back 
in 2004. The machines were offered voluntarily, 
without having been explicitly requested by Futaba. 
This enabled the town personnel to input evacuee 
information. Fixed phone lines were also provided. On 
March 20, a system vendor entrusted with the 
management of information systems (social capital), 
began to use the resident information that it had 
received from Futaba on March 10 for initial taxation 
calculations. With his help, the officials were able to 
view the resident information on Excel and check 
residents’ whereabouts (organizational capital).  
On March 31, administrative functions were 
transferred to the former Saitama Kisai High School 
(closed in 2008) (economic capital), and operations 
were carried out at this site as Futaba’s Saitama branch. 
The officials temporarily entered Futaba together with 
the Self-Defense Forces at the end of March and in 
early April. On those occasions, they picked up the 
devices that they needed for operations, and the 
backup tapes that they had placed in the government 
building on March 12 (organizational capital). At the 
Saitama branch, using these backup tapes, they 
launched a resident information system on a 
provisional server (a notebook computer), and began 
issuing residence certificates. They also provisionally 
restored the family register system with the help of the 
system vendor (social capital), based on the data that 
they had acquired around that time. A private 
telecommunications company carried out networking 
inside the branch. The network and the Internet were 
connected in early April. Operations for the issuance 
of tax payment certificates, resident certificates, 
family register personal matter certificates, and 
registered seal certificates were resumed on April 18. 
On April 22, the entire area of Futaba became a 
restricted zone which means people were not allowed 
to enter the area (symbolic capital). 
Officials created and managed a list of the names 
of evacuees using Excel starting from when they were 
transferred to Saitama (organizational capital). Excel 
was the most user-friendly system available at that 
point of time with officers being accustomed to using 
it on a day-to-day basis. In order to respond in a 
prompt manner in the aftermath of the disaster, 
officials thought it would be better to utilize the system 
of just one company rather than those of the multiple 
system vendors that had been entrusted with the 
management of information systems.  
In September, the network was connected with the 
data center of one particular system vendor, and 
Futaba switched from its provisional server to a server 
which enabled storage of its backup data inside the 
data center (organizational capital). 
On October 28, Futaba opened a Fukushima 
branch (economic capital). This branch was also 
connected with the data center, and Futaba carried out 
contact point operations, such as the issuance of 
certificates. 
 
4.3. Case of Namie Town – repeated escape 
with minimal ICT capital 
 
Namie, located in Fukushima Prefecture is 
adjacent to the northern part of Futaba. At 3:33 p.m. 
on March 11, the first large tsunami arrived at the 
shore of Namie. In the town, 12 evacuation shelters 
were opened. Power went off immediately after the 
earthquake, so means of communication with the 
outside could no longer be used. Information from the 
national government regarding the status of the 
nuclear disaster did not reach the town at all. 
In the morning of March 12, power supply 
resumed and the Mayor, relying on information from 
television, decided to evacuate residents from within a 
10 km radius of the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. At 1 p.m. on 
that day, the Mayor decided to transfer the town’s 
disaster response headquarters to the Tsushima branch 
located in the northwest area of the town (economic 
capital). As they were evacuating to the Tsushima 
branch, information department personnel took along 
three personal computers from the government 
building (organizational capital). Furthermore, in 
order to identify persons affected by the tsunami, the 
officials exported the basic resident register data in 
CSV format, and took it with them as well 
(organizational capital). They did not have enough 
time to take any data other than this. At 3:36 p.m. on 
March 12, a hydrogen explosion took place at Unit 1 
of the power plant. The Tsushima branch could not use 
fixed telephone lines, so made use of two satellite 
phones that had been provided by Fukushima 
Prefecture (social capital), in order to make contact 
with the prefectural government. At 3:41 p.m. on 
March 13, another hydrogen explosion occurred at 
Unit 1 of the power plant, and then at 11:01 a.m. on 
March 14, a hydrogen explosion also occurred at Unit 
3 of the power plant. 
On March 15 at 4:30 a.m., the Mayor, based on 
independent judgment, decided to evacuate to outside 
the town, and requested asylum at the adjacent city of 
Nihonmatsu, which is located around 70 km west from 
the town. At 10 a.m. on that same day, the Mayor 
ordered an evacuation of all of Namie, and the citizens 
and town personnel began evacuating to the 
Nihonmatsu Towa branch (economic capital). 
Personnel took along 10 computers to Nihonmatsu: the 
three personal computers that they had taken from the 
town government building to the Tsushima branch, 
and seven personal computers that had originally been 
set up at the Tsushima branch (organizational capital). 
After transferring office functions to the 
Nihonmatsu Towa branch, officials set up a network 
in order to share one printer among the multiple 
personal computers, though operations were carried 
out in a standalone manner (organizational capital). 
When the officials temporarily went back to the 
government building office around March 20, they 
removed the family register server. 
On April 4, they built a simple server using the 
backup data of the basic resident register, tax, and 
welfare systems that had been stored at the data center 
(organizational capital). The server at the data center 
had originally been used as a backup, so the town was 
using it at the courtesy of a business operator (social 
capital). Starting from late that month, they connected 
the network with the data center (to maintain the basic 
resident register, without multiplexing), and used that 
set-up for operations. The officials continued to use 
the standalone minimal system with one printer and 
personal computers to carry out the issuance of 
certificates, just in case the circuit went down. 
On April 22, the area within a 20 km radius of the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant became a 
restricted zone. Namie was partly included in this area 
(symbolic capital).  
Certificate issuing operations were resumed in 
mid-April at the Nihonmatsu Towa branch.  
At the beginning of May, the officials built an 
internal network (not connected to the Internet) that 
included a file server (organizational capital).  
The most intricate job that the information 
department personnel undertook after the disaster was 
preparing a list of the names of evacuees and 
confirming the survivors. Officials input the name list 
that the citizens had written by hand at the evacuation 
shelter, using an Excel format. They recalled that 
when preparing the name list, they failed to require 
citizens to provide their names in phonetic script 
(hiragana rather than kanji, i.e., Chinese characters) 
and their dates of birth. Checking these two types of 
data against the basic resident register would have 
been the most reliable way of preparing the name list. 
As it turned out, the name list had many names and 
addresses that were written at the evacuation shelter 
and in some cases these hand-written addresses did not 
match with the data that the officials had brought with 
them in CSV format. Furthermore, people were 
moving from the evacuation shelters to the houses of 
relatives, so the evacuation locations of citizens were 
constantly changing, and it was extremely difficult to 
specify their whereabouts. 
As the evacuation location of residents could not 
be registered on the basic resident register system, it 
was impossible to send out notifications related to 
public administration and education, etc.  
  
5. Capital recreating processes 
 
In the following sections, we illustrate how each 
capital was damaged but converted and recreated to 
meet the urgent needs of town officials and citizens. 
Again, this paper employs the five dimensions of 
capital described in Table 1. 
We also show that each capital was restored not 
independently but in a mutually reinforcing interaction. 
The conclusion of this paper presents a model for how 
such interaction restores capital and eventually 
recovers organizational processes that support citizens’ 
lives. 
Among the many organizational processes, we 
chose (1) relocation to temporary offices and (2) 
resumption of certificate issuing operation as our 
observation targets. The former explains the 
restoration of economic capital and the latter describes 
the restoration of organizational capital creation 
processes. They were the two key process 
reconstruction tasks in our three studies. Each town 
was forced twice to move to temporary offices and 
spend around one month to resume certificate issuing 
operations (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Timing of relocating to temporary office 
and resuming operations after the earthquake 
 Moving to 
temporary 
office-1 
Moving to 
temporary 
office-2 
Resuming 
issuing 
operation 
Otsuchi 2 weeks 6 weeks 4 weeks 
Futaba  1 week 3 weeks 5 weeks 
Namie  1 day 4 days 4-5 weeks 
 
This delay was caused by the evacuation of whole 
towns, which forced town personnel to recreate their 
ICT environment from scratch. 
 
5.1. Impact of capital loss in municipalities 
 
Economic and human capital are often cited when 
we talk about the devastating effects of a disaster since 
these dimensions of capital are easy to measure and 
understand. As for the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
the number of the missing and injured as well as the 
number of houses destroyed or damaged can be 
expressed numerically. The impact of losing certain 
dimensions of capital, such as the office building, the 
Mayor and government employees in the case of 
Otsuchi, turned out to seriously delay the recovery 
processes. The Mayor represents the town’s symbolic 
capital. In addition to this, one-third of municipal 
officials, approximately 40 personnel (of 136 officials 
at work in at the time of the earthquake) were lost. 
Imagine how difficult a situation they faced going 
toward recovery. The situation remained intractable 
because the disaster management plan did not foresee 
such forms of economic and human capital loss. 
However, most serious was the loss of organizational 
capital. Otsuchi was about to lose its residential data, 
which is one of the most important components 
necessary for the resumption of certificate issuing 
operations. Until salvage was in fact accomplished, 
officials did not believe their latest residential records 
would recover.  
Neither Futaba nor Namie town lost their 
economic capital in terms of physical structures. 
However evacuation of the entire town following the 
accident of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant 
reduced economic value significantly which, in turn, 
removed symbolic capital from the town. Identity of 
any municipality is bound up with its geography. Thus, 
the loss of “homeland” represents serious damage to 
its symbolic capital. Futaba and Namie had to replace 
their office with unfamiliar locations several times. 
Organizational capital was destroyed with each 
evacuation. Residents were forced to move outside the 
town and this meant they were deprived of social 
capital at the same time.  
Common to all three case studies was the 
destruction of a workable ICT environment, due to the 
loss of electricity, network connectivity, servers, etc. 
In other words, organizational capital was lost and 
required to be recreated in times of ongoing 
evacuation and upheaval. Among all, loss of symbolic 
and organizational capital had perhaps the greatest 
negative effect on the towns’ recovery process. It is 
obvious that symbolic capital takes long time for its 
recovery once it is destroyed, i.e., Otsuchi took five 
months for having its mayoral election, and Futaba and 
Namie still cannot move back to their original 
homeland even more than 4 years after the earthquake. 
Long recovery times for symbolic capital also effect 
organizational capital.  
We should now move on to discuss how each 
dimension of capital was recreated. 
 
5.2. Capital conversion and recreation  
 
In our studies the municipalities were usually 
successful in finding a substitute for their lost 
economic capital. In Otsuchi, municipal buildings and 
land (a community center and the grounds of an 
elementary school) were converted to provide a 
temporary office. In the other towns, a municipal 
branch office and an old high school building were 
turned into temporary offices. These solutions did not 
assume the evacuation status to continue as long as it 
did, but our observations show, in contrast to other 
dimensions of capital, that it was less difficult to 
convert whatever facilities were at hand and recreate 
economic capital. 
It is obvious that human capital cannot be easily 
recovered once it is lost. After his election, the new 
Mayor of Otsuchi asked other municipalities to send 
relief staff and support his town’s disaster relief and 
recovery operations. Consequently, the number of 
relief staff in Otsuchi rose to 150 as of April 2014, 
exceeding the original number of officials. The 
national government allocated a special budget for the 
town’s revival, requiring additional staff.  
In this instance we can observe the power of social 
capital offered by other municipalities. Municipalities 
that were not heavily damaged helped out not only 
with relief staff but also with the ICT environment, 
such as personal computers and printers, as we saw in 
the case of Futaba. Along the same lines, social capital, 
which in these cases comprises voluntary support by a 
number of system vendors, greatly contributed to 
stabilizing the situation in three municipalities and 
recreating organizational capital. As shown in Table 2, 
Otsuchi resumed certificate issuing operations four 
weeks later regardless of losing its residential record 
data. System vendors lent out or donated servers and 
personal computers and supported building network 
connectivity.  
In addition to this, vendors offered town officials 
residential record backups for operations such as 
taxation calculations. These contributions were not 
tied to usual business but were a response to the 
urgency of the moment, demonstrating the strength of 
the relationship between them and the town.  
Officials in Futaba had to return to the original 
town office building to pick up the backup tape and 
only five weeks later recovered certificate issuing 
operations. Namie, on the other hand, used a data 
center to manage its residential record data and did not 
have to fear data loss. Nevertheless, it took four or five 
weeks, almost the same amount of time as for the other 
two towns to restart proper operation.  
In a nutshell, residential record data and donated 
hardware were input to produce useful infrastructure 
for recreating the environment in its basic components 
and conducting operations. We can see how social 
capital allows conversion into organizational capital. 
However, these conversions could not have been 
possible without both human capital, which in this 
paper mainly refers to town officials, and economic 
capital. Officials in Futaba and Namie physically 
delivered personal computers, a tape and a CSV file 
with much needed residential data. Though the 
effectiveness of human capital should have been 
ensured by the disaster management plan, explicit 
instructions listed in the plan could in no way deal with 
the actual situation on the ground. Officials made their 
decision based only on their personal experience.  
Through this capital conversion and recreation 
process, symbolic capital can easily be weakened, or 
lost, whereupon it is difficult to recover. Its loss 
reduces the value of economic capital as we see in the 
case of Futaba and Namie. Based on its definition, 
symbolic capital is interpreted within a social structure. 
That is, social capital is a necessary element for the 
development of symbolic capital. However, the loss of 
symbolic capital experienced by Futaba and Namie 
gradually unfastened residents’ social connections. 
Once they lost the symbolic capital that constituted the 
physical boundary of social capital, reconnection was 
difficult. This initial observation needs further 
evidence to support generalization, but our data show 
that social capital and symbolic capital have a 
reciprocal relationship. 
Figure 2 is a capital resiliency model that 
summarizes discussions in this section. 
Figure 2. Capital resiliency model 
 
6. Development of capital resiliency model 
 
The notion of resilience offers adaptive capability 
that sometimes affects the shape of the ecosystem in 
instances where it faces uncertainty [23, 27]. The 
focus of this paper is to understand how each 
dimension of capital facilitates such an adaptive 
capability through its capital conversion and capital 
creation system. As ordinary business operations show, 
capital conversion converts inputs to outputs by 
adding value. Capital creation is the product of this 
value adding process. However, based on the notion of 
resilience, a disaster requires capital to be recreated, 
not just being created. In this sense, we recognize the 
 
process of enhancing resilience as a capital conversion 
and recreation system. 
It is obvious that each dimension of capital plays 
different, though not independent roles in recreating 
disaster management operations. Organizational 
capital has the most important role in the recovery 
process because it provides the conversion processes 
for recreating capital. In this paper, it refers to 
resuming certificate issuing operations, which 
becomes most important for residents following a 
disaster. 
Disaster preparedness should clarify the way of 
organizational capital recovery. However, from 
empirical data of this research, the situation was 
beyond the assumption of institutionalized or explicit 
knowledge. Organizational capital was recreated 
depending on the situation in the field. This means, as 
long as calamities are diverse, the process of 
organizational capital recovery will take different 
routes. Without adaptive capacity, organizational 
capital cannot be restored. 
Figure 3 summarizes how capital that supports 
municipal citizen services was destroyed and 
recovered in the three towns examined. 
Figure 3. Capital recovery process 
 
In pre-disaster times, organizational processes 
yield a structured five dimensions of capital as a stable 
system for citizen services. Following a disaster of 
unexpected magnitude and/or nature, these 
organizational processes are destroyed and capital is 
destroyed or damaged. Buildings and personnel might 
be lost permanently. In the recovery stage, 
communities are faced with the task of reassembling 
the disintegrated capital, with the addition of newly 
supplied relief, to form new capital enabling support 
of the vital needs of residents.  
As Figure 2 shows, recognition of such capital 
recovery processes make us aware that, at least in the 
analyses of disaster recovery, the five dimensions of 
capital should not be considered in isolation but as a 
set of hierarchically structured, organic relations. 
Symbolic and social capital are mobilized to 
reconstruct economic and human capital that enables 
the recreation of new organizational capital that 
eventually supports services to residents.  
The analysis highlights the importance and 
urgency of recovering organizational capital. To 
achieve this, nurturing social and symbolic capital in 
normal times should be considered in preparation of 
emergency situations. Although they may not be the 
central components of service delivery systems, they 
are critical in the restoration of vital organizational 
capital.  
Social and symbolic capital are related, in that 
social structure affects the creation of symbolic capital 
and at the same time, social capital requires the 
continuous existence of symbolic capital. Social 
capital in general requires trust for it to work [28, 
p.167]. Relationships based on strong trust enable the 
production of something from what’s available at any 
given time to improvise people’s responses in the face 
of uncertainty [28]. The example of a vendor in Futaba 
helping out with data for initial tax calculations, 
thereby enabling officials to check resident 
whereabouts from their temporary office (a concert 
hall in Saitama), illustrates how social capital nurtured 
in ordinary times helps to create an innovative solution 
to an unexpected problem. Japan might have naturally 
high levels of social capital because of its culture and 
homogeneity, an aspect which might require further 
analyses in future research. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Resilience identifies the capacity for collective 
action in the face of unexpected extreme events that 
shatter infrastructure (capital in its various forms) and 
disrupt normal operating conditions [29] [30]. For 
developing a future disaster-tolerant government or 
community, the capacity to mobilize responses in the 
field is important. When we think how to accomplish 
this approach, we tend to focus on the restoration of 
buildings and personnel. 
This paper advances the capital resiliency model to 
reveal organizational processes taking several forms 
depending on capital dimension, with the aim of 
achieving resilience. Case analyses demonstrate the 
importance of recreating organizational capital that 
manages capital conversion and recreation processes 
to meet the vital need of the residents. 
The other implication derived from this research is 
that we should pay more attention to data preservation. 
We now recognize that data as organizational capital 
will not be recoverable once it is completely lost. In 
terms of building e-governments for the future, this 
could be an important topic worthwhile discussing. 
The model was developed on the basis of three sets 
of data stemming from one disaster. It will require 
empirical evidence from future research to generalize 
the model and affirm its reliability. However, at the 
 
same time, we recognize that this model enables us to 
analyze and develop the notion of resilience more 
systematically.  
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